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Conventional wisdom maintains that the Fourteenth Amendment
has been a major success. After all, the Equal Protection Clause was the
basis for the constitutional revolution that ended racial segregation and
began the movements for equal rights for African Americans and wo-
men. Application of the Bill of Rights to the states-undoubtedly one of
the most important constitutional changes-occurred through judicial
interpretation of the Due Process Clause. Fundamental freedoms, such
as the rights to marry, procreate, purchase and use contraceptives, obtain
abortions and raise children, are protected as part of the liberty safe-
guarded by the Due Process Clause.
Although each of these developments warrants applause, focusing
solely on these successes paints a misleading picture of the Fourteenth
Amendment's history. This Essay contends that since its first interpreta-
tions of the amendment, the United States Supreme Court consistently
has made tragic mistakes. Over and over again the Court has adopted
positions that are undesirable as a matter of constitutional interpretation
and social policy.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is written in direct and ma-
jestic language as a constitutional provision should be. The first sentence
was designed to overrule the infamous Dred Scott decision' by establish-
ing that former slaves are citizens of the United States and the states
where they reside.2 The second sentence-perhaps the single most im-
portant sentence found anywhere in the Constitution-states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
• Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center; B.S.,
1975, Northwestern University; J.D., 1978, Harvard University Law School.
1. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (declaring Missouri Compromise un-
constitutional and holding in part that slaves are property, not citizens).
2. The first sentence of Section 1 states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.3
This Essay's thesis is that the promise of these words has gone
largely unfulfilled. Through judicial interpretation, the Court has ren-
dered the Privileges or Immunities Clause a nullity. The Due Process
Clause often has failed to provide procedural protection against arbitrary
government action. Initially, this clause was limited because the Court
said that due process was required only when a right, rather than a privi-
lege, was deprived. More recently, the scope of procedural due process
has been greatly diminished by the embracing of positivism. Under this
view, individuals have liberty and property interests only when the gov-
ernment grants them and are entitled to only the due process that the
government chooses to provide. The use of the Due Process Clause to
protect substantive rights appears forever limited because it has been
tarred with the negative implications of the Lochner era. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause was almost totally unused for the first four score of the
amendment's history. Since then it has been terribly restricted by analy-
sis based on rigid levels of scrutiny that provide no meaningful protection
outside of discrimination based on a few suspect classifications.
Viewed in this way, the Fourteenth Amendment's notable successes
pale in comparison to the promise it originally offered. Indeed, the
amendment's marred record raises questions about the ability of consti-
tutionalism and judicial review to succeed. The first part of this Essay
describes six tragic errors that the Supreme Court has made in interpret-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment. The second part looks to the future in
light of this history. After 114 years of judicial destruction, and in view
of the ideological composition of the current Court, is there any reason to
be hopeful for the future of the Fourteenth Amendment?
II. THE PAST
The vantage point of the present allows a view of the paths not taken
in the past. Hindsight reveals six major mistakes that the Supreme Court
has made in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional
law, and in fact all of American history, would be quite different if the
Supreme Court had not made these rulings.
The mistakes described below are familiar to students of constitu-
tional law. Some of these would be regarded unanimously as grievous
constitutional errors. The reason for recounting them is to gain insight
3. Id. § 2.
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by focusing .on them together. This Essay suggests that when viewed
cumulatively these errors show both the untapped potential of the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as the grounds for doubting whether the
Court will ever use the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle for protect-
ing the privileges or immunities of citizenship, guaranteeing due process
of law or assuring equal protection of the law.
A. The Burial of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
After the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition of slavery, African Americans were persecuted and oppressed
in the South. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, in large part, to
limit state power by imposing on state governments constitutional obliga-
tions to protect the privileges and immunities of their citizens, to provide
due process and to assure equal protection.4 The original Constitution,
which served almost exclusively to create a national government and
limit its powers, was expressly changed to restrict state governments.
Although claims about framers' intent are always suspect, strong
reasons support the belief that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
meant to protect basic rights from state infringement. The words "privi-
leges" and "immunities" were already a part of the Constitution in Arti-
cle IV, Section 2, which prevents a state from denying citizens of other
states the privileges and immunities it accords its own citizens. More
than forty years before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Jus-
tice Washington stated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Ar-
ticle IV protected rights "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."'
During the congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment,
representatives and senators said that the Fourteenth Amendment Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was meant to protect basic rights from state
interference. Senator Howard, for example, quoted Justice Washington's
earlier statement as to the meaning of privileges and immunities and de-
clared: "Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of
in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these
privileges and immunities.., should be added the rights guarantied and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution. "6
4. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVoLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 256-57 (1988).
5. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
6. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
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While commentators dispute whether two-thirds of Congress and
three-quarters of the states shared this view,7 undoubtedly the very text
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause expresses a desire to protect some
rights from state interference. Nevertheless, in the first case interpreting
the clause, the Supreme Court construed it so narrowly that the Court
effectively read the provision out of the Constitution.' Indeed, never in
the entire history of the Fourteenth Amendment has a majority of the
Supreme Court used the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for
declaring a government action unconstitutional.9
In the Slaughter-House Cases,' ° decided in 1873, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause
was not meant to change the relationship between the federal and state
governments or protect rights from state interference.11 By rejecting a
challenge brought by New Orleans butchers to a grant of an exclusive
monopoly to one slaughterhouse, the Court broadly rejected the view
that the clause "was intended as protection to a citizen of a State against
the legislative power of his own State."' 2
Thus the Court made its first tragic mistake in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment in its initial decision construing this provision.
Such a broad opinion was completely unnecessary: the Court easily
could have ruled that the practice of a trade, such as butchering, is not a
"privilege or immunity" and refrained from deciding the larger question
of the overall meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. By over-
reaching, the Court denied the Fourteenth Amendment's main purpose,
which is to limit state power, and read a clause out of the Constitution.
What difference would it have made if the Privileges or Immunities
Clause had remained an available part of the Constitution? At a mini-
mum, the Court could have used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
protect fundamental rights, thereby making the concept of substantive
7. For example, Raoul Berger argues against this interpretation of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-36 (1977). For a powerful criticism of Berger's
historical account, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 334 n.21
(1991).
8. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9. The closest the Court came to a majority opinion was in Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941), where four Justices used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate a
California law limiting migration of indigent persons into the state. Id. at 177.
10. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
11. Id. at 78. For an excellent criticism of the Slaughter-House decision, see Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughterhouse: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409 (1990).
12. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74.
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due process unnecessary. Perhaps the Court would have been more com-
fortable and therefore more likely to protect unenumerated fights under
the language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as opposed to the
more difficult analytical process of justifying implied rights under the
Due Process Clause. Indeed, many, including some conservatives, have
suggested resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for
protecting basic liberties in the future.13
B. The Requirement of State Action
The Supreme Court made its second major error when it strictly
limited the Fourteenth Amendment to government action. In the Civil
Rights Cases, 4 decided in 1883, the Court declared unconstitutional the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited private racially motivated
interference with the use of "the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, [and] thea-
tres."15 The Court ruled that Congress, acting under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was limited to controlling government action
and that the entire amendment applied only to government conduct.
16
This conclusion was not commanded by the text nor the intent be-
hind the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 broadly authorizes Congress
to adopt legislation to implement the amendment. The language of Sec-
tion 1 prohibits a "state" from denying equal protection or depriving life,
liberty or property without due process. However, states might deny
equality or deprive rights by inaction in the face of private wrongs.' 7 A
state government that tolerated private racial discrimination easily could
be deemed to deny equal protection to African Americans. In fact, a
state that used its police and its trespass laws to enforce private discrimi-
nation easily could be found to have acted within the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. More generally, all private violations of liber-
ties occur because the state has chosen to tolerate and not forbid them.
Private power certainly can interfere with fundamental values such
as freedom of speech or equality every bit as much as government action.
Yet, the Civil Rights Cases narrowly construed the power of both Con-
gress and the judiciary to use the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy pri-
13. See Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round
At Last?", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 418-20; Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 63, 68 (1989).
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Id. at 9-10.
16. Id. at 13.
17. For a development of this argument and a criticism of the state action doctrine, see
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985).
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vate wrongs. Although some judicial decisions have attempted to
broaden the definition of state action and the scope of constitutional pro-
tections, 8 the legacy of the Civil Rights Cases has remained firm: the
Constitution applies almost exclusively to government actions.1 9 The
promise and potential of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool for social
justice and equality is thus greatly limited.
The Court need not have been limited to a choice between a rigid
requirement for state action in all Fourteenth Amendment cases or a
complete application of the Constitution to private conduct. Rather, the
Court could have embarked on a more careful analysis by examining the
types of state involvement with private action and state tolerance of pri-
vate wrongs that would justify a conclusion of state action. But the Civil
Rights Cases largely foreclosed this analysis by articulating a blanket rule
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to government actions.
C. Separate But Equal
The Supreme Court's holding in Plessy v. Ferguson,20 that laws sepa-
rating the races are constitutional, may be the greatest tragedy in its in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court upheld a
Louisiana law requiring segregation of the races on railroad cars, declar-
ing that separate-but-equal accommodations are permissible.21 The rul-
ing in Plessy legitimized Jim Crow laws, which segregated virtually every
aspect of Southern life. In reality, of course, facilities were separate, but
definitely not equal. Schools for black children, for example, were not
equal by any measure to those attended by white children. The cost of
Plessy in untapped human potential is incalculable.
18. See, eg., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (extending First Amendment protections to corridors of private shopping
malls), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (refusing to allow testator to racially restrict access to land donated for public park);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (prohibiting political parties from excluding racial mi-
norities from voting in primary elections); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (refusing to
enforce racially restrictive private real estate covenants); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (forbidding private company town from restricting speech on streets and sidewalks).
19. More restrictive recent decisions include NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988)
(concluding that actions by NCAA are not state action); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) (finding no state action when private hospital transfers patients in part because of fed-
eral regulations); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (declaring no state action when
private school receiving at least 90% of operating funds from government fires teacher because
of her speech); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding no state
action where private utility terminates service).
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 540, 548.
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Nor have the effects of government-mandated segregation been
eliminated in the years since Brown v. Board of Education.22 Segregated
schools remain in most American cities, and overall much less is spent on
the average black child's education than on the average white child's
schooling.23 More than a half-century of apartheid in this country-and
apartheid is what it was-left a legacy that will take decades to erase.
The Court in Plessy dismissed the reality that segregation conveys a
powerful and harmful message of racial inferiority. Amazingly, the
Court stated that if African Americans felt stigmatized by laws requiring
segregation, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."
24
Imagine how different America would be today if Plessy had been
decided differently and the Supreme Court had enforced the Equal Pro-
tection Clause throughout the twentieth century and not just in its latter
half. Undoubtedly, racist attitudes would have made the Court's task
difficult. Yet, the institutionalization of segregation and its entrench-
ment in the half century after Plessy surely compounded the difficulties
associated with desegregation and contributed to the racial problems our
society continues to face.
D. The Due Process Clause
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has three substantive
clauses: the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause.25 Thus far, this Essay has suggested
that the Supreme Court's interpretation gutted the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause throughout American history and crippled the Equal Protec-
tion Clause until at least the mid-1950s. This section focuses on the Due
Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause has two different uses, termed respectively
"substantive" and "procedural" due process. Substantive due process fo-
cuses on whether the government has an adequate justification-a suffi-
cient substantive reason-for infringing upon a right that the Court has
deemed protected under the Due Process Clause. Procedural due pro-
cess centers on whether the government has followed adequate proce-
dures in taking away a person's life, liberty or property. The first
subsection argues that the Court erred in its use of substantive due pro-
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Cf. JONATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIEs (1991).
24. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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cess to protect economic liberties. The second subsection examines judi-
cial mistakes concerning procedural due process.
1. Substantive economic due process
From the late nineteenth century until 1937, the Supreme Court
used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to greatly limit the
ability of the government to protect workers and consumers. During a
period of constitutional history known as "the Lochner era," the
Supreme Court declared that the term "liberty" in the Due Process
Clause protected freedom of contract as a fundamental right.2 6 State
laws infringing freedom of contract, such as minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour laws for workers, were invalidated as interfering with freedom
of contract. During this time more than two hundred laws were declared
unconstitutional on the grounds of economic substantive due process.2 7
This series of Supreme Court decisions has been thoroughly
discredited and repudiated in subsequent cases as well as by commenta-
tors on both the left and the right.28 Freedom of contract, as the Court
protected it, never existed. The market limits freedom of contract as
much as, if not more than, any government regulation. Bakers, for ex-
ample, hardly had the ability to bargain to limit their work day to ten
hours. The Court's decisions did not protect neutral rights as the judici-
ary assumed, but rather represented political choices to favor some
classes over others. The economic harshness of the depression made ju-
dicial change imperative and inevitable.29
The Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause during the
Lochner era was a mistake with many adverse consequences. In human
terms, countless people were hurt-many were maimed or died-because
for decades the government was denied the ability to adopt protective
laws.
Moreover, the total discrediting of Lochnerism caused the Court to
disavow any judicial review of economic regulations and legislation. For
26. The phrase "Lochner era" is based on the paradigm case of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law imposing maxi-
mum hours for bakers. Id. at 64.
27. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 444-45 (12th ed. 1991).
28. See, ag., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963) (citing post-Lochner deci-
sions that repudiate liberty of contract argument); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342
U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (noting that Lochner doctrine was discarded). For a summary of the
criticisms of Lochnerism, see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574-81
(2d ed. 1988).
29. For an excellent recent account of this change and its importance in constitutional
history, see 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 105-30.
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example, because of the overreaction to Lochnerism there has been no
judicial protection of a right to practice a trade or regulation. Even ir-
rational protectionist laws have been upheld regularly. For instance, in
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. ,3 the Court upheld an Oklahoma law re-
stricting the ability of optometrists to make eyeglasses which served no
purpose other than to increase business for opticians and opthamolo-
gists.31 Another illustration is New Orleans v. Dukes,32 where the Court
allowed a limitation on pushcart food vending to those vendors who had
operated for eight years.33 In each instance, and many others, the Court
proclaimed it was following post-Lochner deference to the legislature in
economic matters. Thus, the error of Lochnerism triggered a complete
judicial abdication.
In addition, the negative connotations of Lochnerism greatly limited
the use of substantive due process to protect non-economic rights. As
recently as 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut,34 the Court refused to use
the Due Process Clause to safeguard the right to privacy because of its
association with the discredited approach of the Lochner era.35 Writing
for the majority, Justice William Douglas expressly rejected substantive
due process, choosing instead to find privacy in the "penumbra" of the
Bill of Rights.36 Furthermore, when the Court has used substantive due
process to protect basic rights, it has been criticized for using the same
approach followed during the Lochner era.37
Simply put, because of the negative connotations of Lochnerism the
Court probably has refrained from using substantive due process to pro-
tect rights. In light of the earlier burial of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the tarring of substantive due process further limits the Court's
ability to safeguard fundamental liberties.
2. Procedural due process
The simplest, and perhaps most elegant, way of understanding the
Fourteenth Amendment is to view the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
protecting rights from government interference, the Equal Protection
Clause as assuring equal treatment, and the Due Process Clause as pre-
30. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
31. Id. at 487.
32. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
33. Id at 305.
34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. Id. at 481-82.
36. Id. at 485-86.
37. See, e.g., John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973).
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scribing the procedures that government must follow when it takes away
life, liberty or property. At a minimum, the Due Process Clause seems to
define how government must act when it deprives people of their rights.
Yet because of restrictive Supreme Court interpretations, procedural due
process has been greatly limited throughout most of the Fourteenth
Amendment's history.
Initially, the Court restricted procedural due process by making a
distinction between rights and privileges. Under this interpretation, the
Constitution required government to provide due process only when a
right was denied, not when a privilege was removed. 38 For example, due
process was not required when an individual was fired from a govern-
ment job or welfare benefits were taken away because the Court regarded
employment and welfare as privileges rather than rights.39
In Goldberg v. Kelly4' the Supreme Court appeared to reject the
rights-privileges distinction and to expand the government's obligation to
provide due process.41 The Court wisely recognized that people depend
on what previously had been termed "privileges" and in order to limit
arbitrary government power, an expansion in the application of the Due
Process Clause was required.42
Yet, the promise of greatly expanded procedural due process was
almost immediately limited by the Court's retreat to positivism. For ex-
ample, the Court has held that the existence of liberty and property inter-
ests under the Due Process Clause are both based almost entirely on the
rights and expectations created by government laws. In Paul v. Davis,
4 3
for instance, the Supreme Court held that reputation, by itself, was not a
liberty or property interest because state law did not create such a
right.4' Similarly in Board of Regents v. Roth,45 the Court held that
property interests under the Due Process Clause are created by the posi-
38. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934) (holding that right to sue government
is privilege that can be withdrawn at will); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. RPv. 1667, 1717-18 (1975) (examining extension
of due process rights to protect advantageous relations with government); TRIBE, supra note
28, at 680-81 (summarizing development of procedural due process doctrine).
39. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
(holding that government employment is privilege that can be withdrawn at will); TRIBE,
supra note 28, at 681 (explaining distinction between "rights" and "privileges").
40. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process required before termination of welfare benefits).
41. Id. at 261-62.
42. Id.
43. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
44. Id. at 712 (finding no denial of liberty without due process when person wrongly ac-
cused of shoplifting had picture posted by government in department stores).
45. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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tive laws of a state.46 The Court applied the same principle in Bishop v.
Wood 47 and held that a police officer could be fired without due process
because the state's laws did not create an enforceable expectation to con-
tinued employment.48
The foregoing description of procedural due process is sketchy and
omits the protections that have developed under the doctrine. Yet it
makes the point that the Court has underutilized procedural due process
because of its errors in refusing to apply it in cases where so-called privi-
leges were deprived and more recently because of the Court's positivistic
approach to the clause.
E. The Rigid Levels of Scrutiny
Thus far, this Essay suggests that each of the clauses in the Four-
teenth Amendment has been unduly narrowed by the Supreme Court.
Admittedly, it has omitted the important and laudable uses of the
amendment. Some of these positive examples-the desegregation of the
South, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the protection of funda-
mental rights such as reproductive freedom-were mentioned in the in-
troduction. Historically, most of these positive developments did not
occur until the Warren Court era beginning in the mid-1950s.49
The problem with this history is that it paints the Warren Court as
the paragon that saved the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the War-
ren Court undoubtedly did more than any Court in any other constitu-
tional era to realize the promise of the amendment, unfortunately, it also
did damage. Specifically, the Warren Court institutionalized rigid levels
of scrutiny into constitutional jurisprudence, and as a result, limited ef-
fective judicial oversight to a few areas.
The levels of scrutiny can be traced back to the famous footnote four
in United States v. Carolene Products 50 in which the Court explained that
the judiciary would defer to the legislature except in cases involving fun-
damental rights or "discrete and insular" minorities.51 But it was the
46. Id. at 577.
47. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
48. Id. at 347.
49. Some examples of these developments include the Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding "separate-but-equal" doctrine has no place in pub-
lic education); the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights during the 1950s and 1960s,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (noting that many rights guaranteed by first eight
amendments were selectively incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment); and the decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting privacy right of married couples to
use contraception).
50. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
51. Id.
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Warren Court that made clear the radical difference between cases re-
ceiving strict scrutiny, where the government usually lost, and the ra-
tional basis test, where the government almost always won.52 Although
the Court has added intermediate scrutiny as a middle tier of review, it
has maintained its rigid application of the levels of scrutiny.
Relatively few types of discrimination receive heightened scrutiny.
Under current law only discrimination based on race, gender, alienage
and legitimacy receive more than the rational basis test.5 3 As a result,
almost all other types of government discrimination are deemed accept-
able. For example, the Court repeatedly has used rational basis review to
uphold discrimination based on age54 or wealth.55 Government may be
arbitrary and discriminatory so long as it is not acting in the few areas
that have received heightened scrutiny.
The Constitution does not require that judicial review be defined in
this manner. Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prescribes these rigid levels of scrutiny. The Court could
have adopted a more flexible, contextual approach based on evaluating
the importance of the interest and the nature of the classification.
5 6
Moreover, even if one accepts the rigid levels of scrutiny, the rational
basis standard need not lack virtually any teeth nor produce such com-
plete deference to the government.
The rigid levels of scrutiny will continue to limit the scope and effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment far into the future. A conservative
Supreme Court can justify deference to the government simply by refus-
ing to expand the categories receiving heightened scrutiny and then, fol-
52. This analytical framework was powerfully described in Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 8-10 (1972).
53. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to classification based
on illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to classi-
fication based on gender); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny
to classification based on alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying
strict scrutiny to classification based on race).
54. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (holding that lower retirement age for
federal employees covered by foreign service retirement system does not violate equal protec-
tion); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that state law
mandating retirement of police officer at age 50 does not violate equal protection).
55. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that
aid to schools through local property tax that favored wealthier districts does not violate equal
protection); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that welfare regulation limit-
ing total amount of aid regardless of family size or actual need does not violate equal
protection).
56. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 161, 177-82 (1984).
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lowing the established approach, rule in favor of the government under
the rational basis test.
III. THE FUTURE
Viewed together these six mistakes account for much of the
Supreme Court's decision-making under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For those who care about individual rights and social equality, this leg-
acy leaves a sense of lost opportunities. Constitutional history would be
far different if the Court always had used the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to protect fundamental rights; if it always had used the Equal
Protection Clause to prevent discrimination; if procedural due process
always had been a judicially enforced norm.
Overall the Supreme Court regularly has ruled in favor of popular
prejudices, as in Plessy v. Ferguson;57 wealthy economic interests, as in
the Slaughter-House Cases, 8 the Civil Rights Cases59 and the Lochner
doctrine; and government power, as in procedural due process decisions
and under the restrictive levels of scrutiny. Even if one considers all of
the positive developments under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has had
a very mixed record of success.
It must be emphasized that the failures of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are not a product of conceptual errors in drafting the provisions or
mistakes in writing their language. Nothing in the amendment com-
manded any of the judicial errors described above. The decisions are a
product of the ideology of the Justices and the context of their times.
Thus the experience of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects the potential
and the limits of constitutionalism. The Supreme Court can act as a tre-
mendously positive vehicle for social change, as in Brown v. Board of
Education," or the Court can be terribly destructive, as in Plessy v. Fer-
guson.61 The outcome is all a matter of who is on the Court, what they
believe and how they are influenced by current events.
57. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) (relying on history and tradition of state
sodomy laws to hold that right to privacy does not encompass consensual homosexual
conduct).
58. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
59. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that denial of admission to inn or other public accommoda-
tion because of race did not constitute badge or incident of slavery), overruled by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (1988) (all persons entitled to public accommodations without discrimination on ra-
cial grounds).
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In light of this history, what might the future bring? With seven
solid conservative Justices on the Court-Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist, and Justices Byron White, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Clarence Thomas-this Court is
not likely to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for
protecting new rights or expand the coverage of equal protection to safe-
guard additional groups from discrimination. On the contrary, this
Court seems deeply committed to deferring to government and restrict-
ing the Constitution's protections.
62
In view of history and the composition of the current Court, pro-
gressive constitutional commentators have several possible choices. One
option is essentially to give up; perhaps to change fields or to retreat
solely to highly abstract scholarship that is completely removed from ac-
tual Supreme Court decisions. Another choice is to shift attention away
from the Court and toward legislative action. After all, as a practical
reality, for the foreseeable future the protection of rights and the achieve-
ment of equality will have to come from the legislatures and not the fed-
eral judiciary. A third option is to keep trying to encourage the Court to
use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect basic rights and advance so-
cial equality. On the one hand, this seems a terribly futile effort perhaps
for decades to come. Four of the conservative Justices on the current
Court are under age fifty-five and likely will be the core of a conservative
majority for decades to come.
Yet, for the same reason, this judicial era is an especially important
time to keep trying. With the departure of Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall, passionate dissents and well-reasoned attacks on the
Court's reasoning from within will be increasingly rare. It is not impossi-
ble to imagine a Court with eight or even nine conservative Justices.
Scholars will be the only critics of judicial opinions and the only source
for inspiring constitutional change in the future. Competing visions to
the Rehnquist Court's conservative orientation must come from scholars.
Although it is difficult to offer any reason to believe that such alter-
native visions will triumph, history shows occasional crucial advance-
ments under the Fourteenth Amendment, such as Brown v. Board of
62. For a more developed presentation of this argument, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Fore-
word: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989).
[Vol. 25:11431156
UNFULFILLED PROMISE
Education,63 Reynolds v. Sims" and Roe v. Wade.65 Those with more
expansive visions of the amendment's reach must have hope and faith
that similar victories may be attained in the future.
Despite all the tragic errors in interpretation, many, including this
author, believe that society is better off with the Fourteenth Amendment
than it would have been without it. Empirically, it cannot be proven that
on balance the amendment has made society better. Ultimately, all we
have is faith in the Constitution and a hope of achieving the promise of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the future. These beliefs are not much,
but especially during the current era of judicial conservatism, they are
about all we have as we think about the future of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and constitutional law.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that equal protection requires that equal numbers of
voters should elect equal numbers of representatives and invalidating Alabama apportionment
scheme).
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that Due Process Clause right to privacy broad enough
to encompass woman's decision whether to terminate pregnancy).
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